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THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN GETTING THE NEWS:
TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FROM TORT
LIABILITY FOR SURREPTITIOUS NEWSGATHERING
Paul A. LeBel*
INTRODUCTION
The William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal is to be commended for its
prescience in arranging such a timely gathering of a distinguished group of
lawyers and journalists to consider a question that has not received a signifi-
cant amount of attention until some recent developments contributed to a
wider public awareness of the issue: To what extent is the way that news is
gathered a matter of legal consequence? The most newsworthy of these
developments has been the perceived threat of a tort action against CBS
News by Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation for intentional interfer-
ence with a contractual confidentiality provision between Dr. Jeffrey
Wigand and his former employer Brown & Williamson. Dr. Wigand was a
source for a 60 Minutes segment on the tobacco industry, allegedly in viola-
tion of the confidentiality agreement.' Further attention to the issue has
arisen as a result of an injunction that was imposed on Business Week to
prevent publication of material that was sealed under a judicial protective
order, even though the material had been obtained by the Business Week
reporter from a source outside the court.2
The discussion at the Journal's Symposium panel session was lively,
insightful, and instructive. The papers prepared by the principal authors for
this issue of the Journal are carefully researched and well-reasoned, and will
do much to inform both the practice and the scholarship on the topic. The
James Goold Cutler Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary. This
Commentary is based on a Symposium entitled Undercover Newsgathering Techniques:
Issues and- Concerns, sponsored by the Bill of Rights Journal and the Institute of Bill of
Rights Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. The
Symposium was held on February 22, 1996 at the Annenberg Foundation in Washing-
ton, D.C.
' Bill Carter, Dispute Erupts at "60 Minutes" over Canceling of Interview, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995, at 10. Instead, Brown & Williamson sued its former employee
but did not name CBS as a defendant. Bill Carter, Tobacco Company Sues Former
Executive over CBS Interview, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at A14. CBS subsequently
broadcast the interview with Wigand. Bill Carter, CBS Broadcasts Interview with To-
bacco Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at B8.
2 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996), vacat-
ing, 900 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
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most striking phenomenon of the discussion and the papers that make up the
Symposium, however, is the extent to which they are not centered on the
First Amendment.'
The reluctance of practitioners to ground the argumentation of this issue
in the First Amendment is understandable, given the current state of the law.
Regardless of the judicial precedent, however, and freed from the need to
represent a client, a more detached perspective on the question provides a
basis for putting forward the proposition that newsgathering is a realm of
journalistic activity that calls out for constitutional scrutiny-and, if appro-
priate, constitutional protection-just as much as does news publication.'
There is a rich and growing body of case law and scholarly explication
on the ways in which the First Amendment protects the publication of mate-
rial in the public interest. This Commentary addresses the problem of deter-
mining the appropriate relationship between the First Amendment and pos-
sible tort liability for news organizations' activities that take place prior to
publication. That is an issue of vital concern to the integrity and vitality of
contemporary journalism and to the broader interests that are served by a
vigorous press that is free to conduct responsible investigations of newswor-
thy stories with a constitutional shield of some meaningful dimension.
The issue of whether the Constitution is implicated in newsgathering
activities is not satisfactorily resolved by relying on a premise such as "the
First Amendment is no barrier to full responsibility for the consequences of
conduct that is wrongful under laws of general applicability," even if some
version of that premise should appear to have the imprimatur of a narrow
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States.' Although a full-
' Both Professor O'Neil and Mr. Walsh have as their primary focus the effect of
media wrongdoing on the liability for publishing the material obtained through that
wrongdoing. Professor O'Neil does go on to raise the issue of liability for the wrongful
conduct itself. See Robert M. O'Neil, Tainted Sources: First Amendment Rights and
Journalistic Wrongs, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1005 (1996); John Walsh et al., Me-
dia Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The Constitutionality of Consequential Damages
for the Publication of Ill-Gotten Information, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1111
(1996).
4 Two notable contributions to the scholarly literature on the topic are Steven Helle,
The News-Gathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government Expression, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 1, and Diane Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited, or a Modest
Proposal for the Constitutional Protection of the News-gathering Process, 1980 DUKE
L.J. 641. Both articles deal primarily with the issue of press access to information and
places within the control of the government.
' See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). In Cohen, the Court
observed:
This case ... is ... controlled by ... the ... well-established line of deci-
sions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment
simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news .... It is, therefore, beyond dispute that
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fledged development of the issue is beyond the scope of a symposium com-
mentary, it is possible to sketch out briefly the way in which such a devel-
opment might be pursued. Accordingly, this Commentary first identifies the
background that demonstrates that the process of newsgathering is not with-
out constitutional significance. That lesson is derived in a three-step reason-
ing process. First, despite signals from cases such as Cohen v. Cowles Me-
dia Co.,6 constitutional inquiry does not and cannot stop with a character-
ization of behavior as wrongful under otherwise applicable laws. Second, a
legal link should be forged to correspond to the logical link between the
acquisition and the dissemination of information. Third, the press serves a
number of public interest functions in the dissemination of information that
the press alone may have the resources, the interest, and the ability to ac-
quire.
From the lesson of the constitutional importance of the newsgathering
process, this Commentary proceeds to the question of how best to promote
the social good that flows from press acquisition of information. The answer
lies in recognizing a qualified First Amendment privilege against the imposi-
tion of tort liability for surreptitious newsgathering. This answer is not sur-
prising, given the development of a body of law that places constitutional
constraints on significant portions of tort liability for harm caused by dis-
seminating information.' The contours of the proposed privilege are dis-
cussed in the final portion of this Commentary, along with the consideration
of a common surreptitious newsgathering scenario to illustrate the scope and
the justification that a fully developed privilege would require.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NEWSGATHERING
If publication were the only media activity subject to constitutional pro-
tection, investigative journalism would be chilled as a result of the potential
exposure to liability for criminal or tortious conduct engaged in during the
newsgathering process. That deterrence would be of different strength at
different times and under different circumstances,8 but recent developments
"[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of
others." . . . Accordingly, enforcement of such general laws against the press is
not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other
persons or organizations.
Id. at 669-70 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937)).
6 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
7 See, e.g., DAVID ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER'S GUIDE (1993); DAVID EL-
DER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY (1991); Paul A. LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation:
An Accommodation of the Competing Interests Within the Current Constitutional
Framework, 66 NEB. L. REV. 249, 252-87 (1987) ("primer" on constitutional develop-
ments in defamation law since Sullivan).
8 For consideration of the tort and contract liability of the investigative journalist,
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in which investigative reporting targets have aggressively attacked the media
investigators indicate that the fear is real, not imagined, and that its effect
could be immediate.
This portion of the Commentary explores the issue of whether there is a
constitutional significance to newsgathering activity. By analogizing to the
constitutional protection that has developed around media publication that
defames or invades privacy, the conclusion is reached that newsgathering
has constitutional significance, and that the imposition of legal remedies or
sanctions on the press raises First Amendment implications.
A. Wrongdoing and the First Amendment
The premise that the First Amendment provides'no protection from full
liability for one who engages in wrongdoing during the gathering of news
suffers from a logical flaw and an analogical shortsightedness. When these
missteps are corrected, the identification of a more appropriate premise can
proceed.
First, as to logic. Stating that an act committed while newsgathering is a
legal wrong-and is therefore afforded no constitutional protection-ignores
the extent to which the initial characterization of the act as a wrong begs. the
ultimate question. What constitutes wrongdoing, whether tortious or-criminal
in nature, is a function of positive common and statutory law with a con-
stitutional overlay. For laws in general, that constitutional overlay includes a
range of personal liberty guarantees that act to constrain the federal and
state governments.
For laws that impact the dissemination of information, the First Amend-
ment serves as the greatest constraint on the accountability of publishers and
speakers. One cannot conclude that an act is legally wrongful until one has
been satisfied that there is no superior First Amendment interest implicated
in the attempt to apply criminal sanctions to, or to require the payment of
tort damages by, the person committing the act. The proper scope of the
application of legal rules that recognize criminal and civil liability can be
determined only after a consideration of whether and how First Amendment
interests could be threatened by their application.
The closest analogy from which support for this proposition can be
drawn is the experience of more than thirty years of constitutionalization of
the tort laws of defamation and invasion of privacy. Although the argument
see Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Inva-
sions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1995); John W. Wade, The Tort Liability of
Investigative Reporters, 37 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1984); Lyrissa C. Barnett, Note, Intru-
sion and the Investigative Reporter, 71 TEX. L. REv. 433 (1992); Kevin F. O'Neill,
Note, The Ambush Interview: A False Light Invasion of Privacy?, 34 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 72 (1983).
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had been made -that the First Amendment does not immunize speakers and
publishers from liability under standard tort doctrines of general applicabili-
ty,9 the Supreme Court has articulated, beginning in New York Times Co: v.
Sullivan,1' a strong vision of a common law tort liability that is tightly con-
strained when its application affects the public interests protected by the
First Amendment.
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld a judgment awarding
the plaintiff damages for libel for the New York Times's publication of an
advertisement containing factual mistakes. To the extent that Alabama libel
law permitted L.B. Sullivan to recover $500,000 in damages from the New
York Times and four individuals whose names appeared as sponsors of the
challenged fundraising advertisement,11 the Times could surely be said to
have acted in a wrongful manner in publishing statements that could be
taken as defamatory of Mr. Sullivan. The significance of the Supreme
Court's constitutionalization of tort law in Sullivan lies in its refusal to let
large portions of that law be applied to "speech that matters," 2 that is,
speech that is infused with a public interest. The underlying policy judgment
is that the public is better served by a world that allows this type of speech
than one in which it is suppressed.
In later cases, the Court articulated the method by which to determine
how the First Amendment and the potentially conflicting ends of private law
were to be reconciled. Initially stated in terms of striking an accommodation
between the interest of the press in immunity from liability and the state
interest in support of an individual's claim for compensation,1 3 the method-
ology that courts are to employ was clarified in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 4 The constitutional acceptability of a rule impos-
ing liability for defamatory speech turns on a balancing of "the State's inter-
est in compensating [people in the position of the plaintiff] for injury to
their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting this type
of expression."'"
This methodology can be translated to the newsgathering context: if a
state were to apply a general law of criminal or civil liability to the press
for activities conducted in the course of newsgathering, the Dun &
Bradstreet analysis should be performed. What is constitutionally permissi-
ble to treat as wrongful after Sullivan and its progeny is only determinable
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 40 (Ala. 1962) ("The
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous publications."),
rev'd, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
" Sullivan, 144 So. 2d at 34.
,2 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
13 Id. at 343.
" 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
15 Id. at 757.
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when one employs the methodology of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 6 and
Dun & Bradstreet to balance the interests served by the law creating liabili-
ty and the First Amendment interests threatened by that liability.
B. Acquisition and Dissemination of News
Although the previous discussion may indicate the methodology that
would be used to recognize a constitutional privilege for newsgathering, it
remains to be demonstrated that newsgathering is as constitutionally signifi-
cant as the defamatory speech that was protected in the Sullivan line of
cases. That demonstration begins at precisely the same place as the reason-
ing in Sullivan, with the "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open."'7 Working from that principle, the Supreme Court has consistently
held that speech that contributes to that debate, even if it is speech that
defames or invades the privacy interest of a plaintiff, may not be subjected
to the risk of media self-censorship resulting from exposure to common law
liability that is not limited or qualified by First Amendment constraints. 18
Although the scope of those constraints may expand or contract depending
on such variables as the private or public status of the plaintiff, the private
or public nature of the speech, and, perhaps, the media or non-media status
of the defendant, the principle that the First Amendment sets limits on tort
liability for publication is now so firmly established as to be unquestion-
able." The analytical framework developed around that principle provides
an instructive analogue for responding to the questions of whether, and if
so, how, the First Amendment applies to tortious behavior of the media
apart from or prior to publication.
Justice Brennan's clarion call in Sullivan still rings true: the commitment
to vigorous robust debate about matters of public interest is at the heart of
the contemporary understanding of the First Amendment. Two features of
that commitment need to be understood: it is qualified and it is instrumental.
With those features properly in balance, the foundation can be laid for a
First Amendment privilege for newsgathering.
The qualified nature of the commitment is evidenced by the continuing
sensitivity to the interests of the people whose reputations and privacy are
affected adversely during the course of that robust debate. False and defam-
atory speech may have no constitutional value in itself, but it must be pro-
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
18 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
"9 But see Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 782 (1986).
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tected so that the public benefits from exposure to the full panoply of
speech that does contribute to the public interest. At some point, however,
the constitutional value of the challenged speech can sink below the counter-
vailing interest of protecting the victim of that speech. At that point, the
imposition of liability on the speaker passes constitutional muster.
The instrumental nature of the commitment to the principle of robust
and uninhibited debate on public issues may be less explicit in the decisions
of the Supreme Court than is the qualified nature of that commitment. One
might assert, for example, that this principle is a good in itself, rather than
just because of the beneficial end it serves. If that is the assertion, then the
remainder of this part of the analysis is of less interest, because that starting
point is stronger than my starting point. My concern is with those who need
to be persuaded that there is a consequentialist, not a teleological, argument
underlying the principle of robust debate on public issues. This same
consequentialist reasoning can then be used to support the. assertion that
constitutional protection should extend to newsgathering.
If one asks why a commitment to robust public debate should be a mat-
ter of constitutional significance, the most compelling answer lies in the role
that the debate plays in a representative democracy. The Constitution is a
charter of government, not Robert's Rules of Order writ large.2" The debate
is instrumental in the sense that it informs the public, who elect the officials,
who exercise the power in ways that are the subject of public debate, which
needs .to be robust to inform the public, who elect the officials ... and so
on.
In that debate, there may be "no such thing as a false idea,"'" but there
certainly can be uninformed, ill-advised, and pernicious ideas. The correc-
tive function that is served by "the competition of other ideas"22 is best
fulfilled when ideas are grounded in evidence that is as complete and as
accessible to the ultimate decisionmakers in the body politic as possible.
The Constitution protects even valueless false statements of fact in an
explicitly instrumental way, namely, by dissuading the speaker from self-
censorship.' If one sees the speech that is being promoted, or at least not
deterred, as itself instrumental in the governance process preserved by the
Constitution, then it requires only a short step to realize that the constitu-
tional inquiry encompasses not only the. publiction of the factual state-
ments, but also that it extends to the way in which these factual statements
are acquired.
20 Cf Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting
a danger that the Supreme Court "will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a
suicide pact").
21 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339.
22 Id. at 340.
' See id. at 340-41.
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A truly robust public debate contemplates something richer than a purely
formal exchange of fixed positions. The notion of public debate anticipates
an openness to the consideration of new ideas and a willingness to accom-
modate new information. Much of the content of the debate about public
issues is likely to come from somewhere outside of the pre-existing knowl-
edge of the individual debaters. A healthy and valuable debate certainly
ought to include the opportunity for some meaningful addition to the store
of information with which the citizens, who ultimately pass on the merits of
the competing ideas, are equipped at the start. Indeed, that something is a
public issue requiring careful consideration is often the result of an active
process of bringing a matter to the public's attention.
At this point in the analysis, one might fall back onto the premise articu-
lated at the outset of this Commentary. One might say that the speech that
enters into the public debate about matters of public interest is fully protect-
ed, but the means of acquiring the content of that speech are outside the
purview of the constitutional provisions that protect its publication. To do
so, however, would be to repeat at the level of instrumental analysis the
missteps criticized earlier as matters of limited logic and too narrow analo-
gy.
If the ideas and opinions in the public debate are to compete for public
acceptance, and if their strength depends on the quality of the supporting
evidence, then the process of acquiring that evidence should be understood
to share in the constitutional attention at least to the extent that is given to
speech that injures reputation and invades privacy. To hold otherwise would
be to limit the public debate to the exchange of views about information that
others have interjected voluntarily into the public arena. Such a limitation
would value form over substance, or place a premium on form at the price
of ignoring its effect on function.
If it is not to be a sterile exercise, debate about public issues should be
constantly reinvigorated with new information and fresh ideas. To deter the
acquisition of new information by the threat of civil or criminal liability
raises the same constitutional problem as the deterrence of the publication of
information that may turn out to be false and defamatory or invasive of
privacy. "[S]peech ... matters"24 because of what it contributes to an in-
formed citizenry exercising control over the course of their lives and the
conduct of their government. Because the inventory of the storehouse of
facts that inform the "speech that matters" must continually be replenished
and expanded for the debate about what matters to be effective, how that
process occurs cannot plausibly or responsibly be treated as a matter of con-
stitutional indifference.
One of the lessons that emerges most clearly from the defamation and
privacy arena is that an individual can be classified as a public figure and
24 Id. at 341.
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thereby be deprived of some measure of common law tort protection against
defamation and invasion of privacy. 2 This occurs because of a legitimate
public interest in the publication of information about some aspect of the
public figure's life. Against that constitutional background, no great leap of
imagination is required to envision an analogous category of information
that is in the public interest, albeit not yet in the public domain.
C. The Public Interest in the Media Acquisition of News
If the same constitutional interest in the publication of information and
ideas extends to the acquisition of that information, one might still contend
that the media are entitled to no greater protection in their news acquisition
activities than would be available to private individuals or officers of the
government. The final piece of the foundation for constructing a constitu-
tional privilege for newsgathering requires an appreciation of why there is a
public interest in protecting media representatives when they carry out their
newsgathering activities.
The constitutional principles that have developed in the resolution of
media access issues support the notion that the Constitution is implicated in
how news is gathered. Limiting the acquisition of information to private
individuals would be to ignore the reality of the role that the press serves in
identifying not just what the public will be interested in but also what is in
the public interest. If the press is entitled to access to a courtroom, for ex-
ample, as a surrogate for the individual citizen who herself could choose to
invest the time and energy in observing that part of the governmental pro-
cess,26 then an important point in the construction of the constitutional
privilege for newsgathering is the idea that the press may act in a way that
an individual citizen may act in acquiring information.
Acquisition of information is often an expensive enterprise. The public's
limited access to certain areas and its limited resources justify recognizing
the surrogate role of the press. Similar justifications based on access and on
resources affect what ought to be constitutionally permitted during the
course of surreptitious newsgathering. The public at large has an interest in
the role that the press plays in informing the public about the behavior of
others, in affecting the conduct of public officials and public figures, and in
deterring wrongful conduct by both public officials and private individuals.
That public interest could be served in theory by a government official,
but relying exclusively on the government to serve these functions is mis-
guided in two respects. First, the target of an investigation often may be the
government itself. To restrict public debate to information that public offi-
cials choose to interject into that debate would be to provide a dispropor-
' See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
26 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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tionate advantage to the holders of public office. Second, to the extent that
the target of an investigation is a private rather than a public person or enti-
ty, even when the target is engaged in criminal wrongdoing, there may well
be insufficient attention paid to the problem by the government officials
charged with enforcing the relevant provisions of the criminal code. In a
world of limited investigatory and prosecutorial resources, even the most
benignly motivated decisions about where to devote time and energy neces-
sarily depend on efficiency calculations and on assessments of how to
achieve the broadest public good. Media activity, particularly in the form of
investigative journalism, can be a valuable supplement to official conduct.
The press can help not only to shape the agenda of law enforcement author-
ities, but also to alert the public about the threat posed by the target of the
investigation.
II. TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE FOR NEWSGATHERING
Thus far, this Commentary has provided a glimpse of the blueprint for
constructing the steps in the reasoning that leads to the conclusion that the
Constitution is implicated when a state attempts to hold the press liable for
newsgathering activity. The core notion of the constitutional privilege that
should be developed for newsgathering flows naturally from the instrumen-
tal argument presented above. News acquisition is a matter of constitutional
significance because it is a logically and pragmatically necessary component
of the publication of news that serves a vital constitutional function. Accord-
ingly, the basic premise of this privilege for newsgathering can be stated in
the same instrumental terms:
The First Amendment offers protection for conduct leading
to the acquisition of information that it would be in the pub-
lic interest to publish.
Whether the imposition of liability is constitutionally permissible should
depend on the result of the same balancing methodology that is employed in
the area of First Amendment protection of tortious speech:
Courts should balance the state interest that is served by the
legal rule sought to be applied against the representative of
the press arising out of the newsgathering activity against
the First Amendment interest that is served by the acquisition
of the information through that activity.
For the same reasons that constitutional privileges developed around liability
for defamation and invasion of privacy, the balance should not be struck on
a purely case-by-case basis. Rather, courts should "lay down broad rules of
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general application," even though those "rules necessarily treat alike various
cases involving differences as well as similarities., 27 Just as the constitu-
tional protection for the publication of damaging information is qualified
rather than absolute, so too is this privilege:
The First Amendment protection for acquisition of informa-
tion can be overcome by a stronger state interest in forbid-
ding certain activity and in attaching criminal and civil
sanctions to conduct that contravenes those prohibitions.
The employment of any balancing methodology creates the potential for
controversy regarding what should be weighed in the balance and the
amount of weight that should be given to any particular factor. To get a
sense of how a balancing would shape the contours of the privilege advocat-
ed in this Commentary, consider an investigative journalistic situation loose-
ly based on what is increasingly appearing on the networks and on syndicat-
ed programming: the use of an undercover reporter with a hidden camera.
Suppose that a news organization believes that a private business firm is
acting in a way that threatens the public health or safety. Real life examples
of this hypothesis can be found in such current litigation settings as the
action by Food Lion against ABC News for its Prime Time Live investiga-
tion of the food chain's meat selling operations." During the panel discus-
sion of these issues at the Journal Symposium, one of the participants pre-
sented another Prime Time Live story on a driving school for persons con-
victed of driving while intoxicated. This school sold course completion
certificates to people who did not attend the course and who were then able
to retain or get back their driver's licenses.29
The basic fact pattern at issue is that an investigative journalist misrep-
resents his or her true status and obtains entry to a location controlled by
the party who will soon become the tort plaintiff. While at that location, and
in the assumed role, the reporter is able to observe and photograph behavior
of the plaintiff or its agents. Eventually, a report about the behavior is aired.
Presumably, the First Amendment analysis of the media defendant's publica-
tion or broadcast of the information acquired in this manner could be con-
ducted under the constitutional framework currently in place. The question
for consideration is whether the media defendant is subject to liability for
conduct that occurred while investigating the story using the surreptitious
methods described above.
27 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44.
28 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
2 See Prime Time Live: School for Scandal (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 20,
1995).
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As the Food Lion litigation indicates, the claims asserted against a news
organization can revolve around four different aspects of the reporter's con-
duct: (1) misrepresentation of the status of the reporter; (2) physical entry
into the premises of the investigative target; (3) hidden recording of the
target's employees; and (4) concerted action with people outside of the news
organization to obtain and publicize information about the target that would
be damaging to the target and/or beneficial to the third party. 31' The proper
scope of liability for each of these aspects of media conduct can be analyzed
through the use of the balancing methodology described above.
The remainder of this Commentary will offer a very preliminary sketch
of the interests involved and of the policy implications of subjecting the
media behavior to liability. Even such a cursory sketch can be useful in
indicating the ways in which a more extensive consideration of the shape
and strength of a constitutional privilege could be developed.
A. Misrepresentation of Media Status
Some years ago, the New Yorker published a cartoon under a caption
such as "The Man with a Clear Conscience", in which a stereotypical busi-
nessman sat behind a large desk, smiling and speaking something like these
words into an intercom: "You say Mike Wallace is here with a camera
crew? Well, send him right in!" Today, the news magazine crew may very
well be bringing with it a copy of a videotape recorded by an undercover
camera in one of the interviewee's plants or offices. The purpose of the
interview may be to get the target's reaction to the hard evidence of corpo-
rate wrongdoing. Indeed, the interview may begin with the target being
invited to issue routine denials of wrongdoing that are then shown to be
inconsistent with the evidence on the tape.
Disguising the status of the reporter is an obvious tactic of investigative
journalism. If I am engaged in wrongdoing, I am at least likely to be smart
enough to cease that activity when the network news producer shows up
with a camera and a microphone. Getting someone in place to observe me
acting in an illicit manner depends in large part on characterizing the report-
er as someone other than a reporter.
Misrepresentation claims arising out of the disguise are not far-fetched
in many of these settings. If I would not have acted in a certain way had I
known who the reporter was, and if because the reporter purported to have
some other status I acted in that way in the presence of the reporter, then I
may be said to have relied to my detriment on the false and material state-
ments of fact by the reporter." Should the airing of the information ob-
tained in this fashion result in harm to me, including economic harm that
3, See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 816-22.
3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
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flows from the publication or broadcast, then traditional tort doctrines would
allow me to recover damages for that harm.32 The issue of whether there is
a constitutional restriction on media liability for the misrepresentation of the
reporter's status is thus a matter of considerable importance.
The balancing methodology proposed in this Commentary calls for an
initial identification of the factors that are placed on each side of the scale:
the First Amendment interest in the acquisition of the information by dis-
guising or misrepresenting the status of the reporter versus the interest
served by the legal rule that imposes liability on the news organization for
its misrepresentation. Once the factors on each side of the balance are
known, then an informed policy choice about the more compelling of the
two interests can be made, and the legal rule that attaches liability to media
behavior can be either upheld or struck down as violative of the First
Amendment.
On the First Amendment side of the balance, the necessity for the mis-
representation would be one of the most important factors. If absent the dis-
guise, the reporter would probably not have had access to the wrongdoing,
then the First Amendment interest is stronger than it would be in a case
where the reporter's status is irrelevant.
Of equal importance to the necessity of the misrepresentation would be
the nature of the public's interest in the information being acquired. If press
access to the wrongdoing is necessary to inform the public about a matter of
public interest, then the First Amendment side of the scale receives even
more weight. Although line-drawing between categories of speech is risky
and controversial, one can nevertheless contemplate a rough distinction
between matters that are merely interesting to the public and matters that are
infused with a public interest. The more confident one is in characterizing
the information in the latter category, the greater the weight attached to the
First Amendment interest in the acquisition of the information, even though
that acquisition is obtained as a result of a reporter misrepresenting her
status.
Attention should also be paid to the reasonableness of the news
organization's belief that the investigation is warranted. This Would require
an examination of the credibility of sources and the body of evidence extant
at the time the investigation moved to the stage of misrepresenting the status
of the reporter.
The state interest in being free from misrepresentations of the status of
those with whom one deals is not trivial. We routinely depend on the quali-
fications of those who provide services and on the legitimacy of the claims
of those who ask us to act in certain ways. When the target of the investiga-
tion is acting in a wrongful manner, however, the interest in the accuracy of
the representation may be entitled to less weight.
32 Id. § 549.
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The most critical factor in assessing the strength of the interests protect-
ed by tort law in this situation is likely to be the nature of the access that
the reporter obtained through the disguise. If my wrongful conduct routinely
occurs in the presence of others, either because I enlist them in the wrong-
doing or because I assume that they are coming to me to get the benefit of
my wrongdoing, then the misrepresented status of the reporter should be less
problematic to the body of law that protects me from the consequences of
that misrepresentation. What matters most in this scenario is that my con-
duct would have been equally observable by someone who was not a report-
er. The news media affiliation of the person in whose presence I act is a
risk that I could be said to have assumed, in much the same way that I
would run the risk that the person was actually an undercover law enforce-
ment officer.
B. Physical Entry into the Target's Premises
When an investigative journalist enters the property of the target, the
civil and criminal laws of trespass may come into play.33 Tort liability may
attach to an entry that is without the permission of the owner or occupier of
the premises or that exceeds the scope of the permission.34 Leaving a re-
cording device on the premises of the investigatory target without the per-
mission of the target could constitute a continuing trespass.35
As is true in many instances of tortious behavior in newsgathering, the
unauthorized nature of the entry into the premises of the tort plaintiff is
often combined with misrepresentation of the status of the reporter. Had the
true status of the reporter been known, permission to enter would have been
denied or the permission originally expressed or implied would have been
withdrawn.
The state interest in enforcing exclusive possession and the right to
exclude others from one's own property is quite high. Nevertheless, the First
Amendment may also be implicated by the existence of a public interest in
members of the news media obtaining information about those acts that
occur on one's property that have the potential to affect public health or
safety. If the two interests were weighed in the abstract, one would suspect
that the property right would trump the interest served by a private person's
invasion of the premises of another, given the historical prominence of the
interest in exclusive possession.
3" See Note, And Forgive Them Their Trespasses: Applying the Defense of Necessity
to the Criminal Conduct of the Newsgatherer, 103 HARV. L. REV. 890 (1990); David F.
Freedman, Note, Press Passes and Trespasses: Newsgathering on Private Property, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1298 (1984).
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
35 Id. § 161.
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One clear lesson from the experience of determining how the First
Amendment sets constraints on the imposition of liability for the publication
of damaging information is that the balancing is to be done with a focus on
the particular legal rule under which the publisher is sought to be held lia-
ble. The balancing methodology for deciding whether there is a First
Amendment protection against liability for some intrusions into the premises
of an investigative target could very well be directed not toward the abstract
principle of the importance of an exclusive possessory interest, but rather on
how the law seeks to enforce that interest.
The traditional trespass notion of allowing damages even if no harm is
done to the premises or its occupants could be an appropriate element to
consider in exercising constitutional scrutiny.36 Historically, the tort of tres-
pass to land has been one of the most formalistic causes of action. The
interest that is protected by the tort action is the exclusivity of the possesso-
ry right, so liability may be imposed even if no harm is done to the premis-
es. The mere fact of entry is inconsistent with the control over access that
the occupier is entitled to exercise, and damages can be awarded for the
entry itself.
Under an alternate view of the tort that accommodates a First Amend-
ment interest in the entry, the focus would turn from the mere fact of the
reporter's unauthorized entry to what is done while the reporter is on the
premises. Physical .damage to property would be difficult to protect, but
observation and recording of what is otherwise visible and audible would be
considerably more defensible. The First Amendment interest could thus,
under some circumstances, be found to outweigh the countervailing state
interest in the recovery of damages for the entry itself, rather than for the
damage that is done by or during the unauthorized entry.
C. Hidden Recording of the Target's Activities
The adoption of aggressive investigative journalistic techniques by the
broadcast media opens the door to recording of sounds and pictures that are
intended to be broadcast to the public, rather than just to serve as back-
ground information in support of a written news account. The critical inqui-
ry is whether recording the events that take place during entry onto the
premises of another receives constitutional protection similar to the entry
itself.
The most useful analogy in deciding how to approach this aspect of
investigative journalism would be the creation of, under the guise of this
privilege, a counterpart to the plain view doctrine of the law governing
search and seizure. A reporter rummaging through my files when I am out
of my office, for example, presents a very different scenario from a reporter
36 Id. § 163.
1996] 1159
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
standing across from my desk and surreptitiously taping my offering or
accepting a bribe. What I do in the presence of others would seem to in-
volve less of a state interest in protecting me from recording than what I
have taken steps to secure from public view.
Just as the state or private interest needs to be weighed only after focus-
ing on the precise features of the legal rule that attempts to protect or en-
force that interest, so too the First Amendment interest needs to be identi-
fied in terms of the precise category of journalistic behavior that is at issue.
Following this suggestion, one might hypothesize that there is a significant
First Amendment interest in the activity of hidden recording that is different
from and perhaps stronger than the interest in mere presence on the part of
a reporter. The additional credibility associated with the images and the
sounds that are recorded in an encounter of this sort contributes to the pub-
lic information about the matter in question in a more meaningful and dra-
matic way than an account of the encounter that is unsupported by film or
tape.
One can imagine other press tactics that are more troublesome because
the interest of the target of the investigation weighs more heavily. A hidden
camera or tape recorder carried by a reporter is in many respects an exten-
sion of the eyes or ears of the reporter. A recording device secreted in the
office of the target, however, would have the capacity to capture actions and
conversations that occur when no one comparable to the reporter is present.
Although the First Amendment interest in the acquisition of the information
may be identical to what it was in the case of the recorder carried by the
reporter, the interest against devices being planted on the premises of the
target, grounded in the expectation of privacy when the person (who turns
out to have been a reporter) was no longer present, would likely rise to a
level that is sufficient to overcome the constitutional interest.
D. Concerted Action with a Third Party
Although it is not impossible that an investigative journalist may simply
wake up one morning and decide that there must be a story at the X Corpo-
ration that is worth an investment of time, energy, and money, the more
likely scenario is that someone other than the news organization personnel
and the target is involved in setting the stage for the investigation or in
assisting in its pursuit. Along with all the other aspects of exposure to liabil-
ity that may be attached to surreptitious newsgathering, the media organiza-
tion may find itself a defendant to a claim that it has conspired with the
third party to cause harm to the investigative target37 or to provide a bene-
fit to the third party.
31 See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811
(M.D.N.C. 1995) (dismissing RICO claims against ABC and network employees).
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Two scenarios of the relationship to the third party need to be consid-
ered. In the first scenario, the media representative is approached by a third
party and provided with information that suggests a promising avenue of
investigation. In the second, the media representative approaches a third
party in a search for investigative leads. These situations are closer to the
heart of the journalistic enterprise than any of the other three aspects of
media behavior. Allowing a tort claim against the media in these situations
constitutes a serious infringement on the interests of the press and the public
in the acquisition and dissemination of information.
When a member of the press is approached by a source, the potential
exists for linking the media to the enterprise in which the source is other-
wise engaged. The possibilities for press involvement range from a relative-
ly innocuous ride-along relationship with law enforcement officers to much
more questionable conduct on the periphery of ongoing criminal conspira-
cies. The issue that might arise in these situations is whether the media
representative should be exposed to liability on the same basis that would be
applied to the source. For example, if the police officers with whom a jour-
nalist was riding were held liable for damages for the harm caused by their
activities, could the journalist similarly be held liable? If the source of infor-
mation about an unlawful activity were himself engaged in unlawful activi-
ty, would the journalist who works with the source be exposed to similar
liability?
The appropriate consideration in assessing the liability of the media
representative for involvement in the activity engaged in by the source is the
journalist's connection to the activity, not the connection to the source. The
application of vicarious liability or conspiracy theories of liability to the
press under these circumstances would impede the flow of information that
could be obtained from these contacts, from which the public could ulti-
mately benefit. The important feature of these situations is the journalistic
role occupied by the press representative. To hold the press liable to the
same extent as the source would be to ignore the role of the press and the
public interest it serves.
When the investigative function is not at issue, or when other aspects of
journalistic behavior might lead to a conclusion that liability ought to be
imposed, the First Amendment interest in the acquisition of information may
be outweighed here as in other instances. One can imagine, for example, a
reporter on a police "ride-along" who damages the property of someone
whose premises are raided by the police. There is little, if any, First Amend-
ment interest in protecting the media from liability for that property damage.
There is a significant First Amendment interest, in contrast, in protecting the
media from liability for the intrusion into the premises or for the privacy
invasion that might occur. Those latter claims go to the essence of the jour-
nalistic activity. Even if the police officers themselves should ultimately be
held liable, the liability ought not to extend to the press representative who
accompanied the officers.
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The contact between the press and the source may arise in precisely the
opposite fashion, with the source being contacted by the reporter. In this
situation, the exposure to liability is more likely to come from a claim that
the media conduct has induced the source to act in a way that is damaging
to the investigative target. The recent publicity surrounding the CBS 60
Minutes segment on the tobacco industry raises the issue of tort liability in a
very compelling fashion, as well as bringing to the foreground the public
interest served by the press in these situations.3"
Tort liability for interference with a contract between the source and the
target, or for otherwise interfering with advantageous relationships of the
target, has a built-in interest-balancing that would seem perfectly capable of
resolving the issue of whether an imposition of liability would serve a
broader public interest. 9 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provisions on
liability for an intentional interference with contractual relations are phrased
in terms of "improper" interference.4" The factors for determining whether
an interference is improper replicate the kind of interest analysis suggested
in this Commentary as being not only appropriate for, but required under,
the First Amendment.4'
There is an advantage in recognizing that there is a public interest that
has constitutional significance when deciding whether an interference is
improper. Grounding this interest in the First Amendment means that courts
would be required to accord it full constitutional weight, undiluted by any
local resistance to, or skepticism about, the wisdom of the "profound nation-
al commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open."42
CONCLUSION
A brief commentary on a symposium topic can hope to do little more
than to reinforce the significance of the subject with which the symposium
deals and to suggest promising avenues for further scholarly efforts. This
Commentary has attempted to show that the legal issues surrounding liabili-
ty for surreptitious newsgathering are matters of considerable doctrinal and
policy complexity.
If those issues are to come before courts with greater frequency, as
seems likely to happen, careful attention needs to be given to striking an
3" See James C. Goodale, CBS Must Clear the Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at
A23.
" Sandra Baron et al., Tortious Interference: A Practical Primer for Media Practi-
tioners, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1027 (1996).
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
41 Id. § 767.
42 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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appropriate balance between the interests traditionally protected by the First
Amendment and the interests served by the rules of tort law, under which
liability is sought to be imposed on journalists who gather the news using
undercover methods. Demonstrating that such a balancing is needed, consti-
tutionally appropriate, and manageable are tasks for the future. This sketch
of a way to construct the argument and a preview of some features of its
applications to investigative journalism illustrates that the tasks are worth
undertaking.
